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Methodological nationalism and the domestic analogy: Classical resources for their critique 
(Forthcoming at the Cambridge Review of International Affairs). 
 
Daniel Chernilo* 
 
Abstract 
The critique of methodological nationalism first arose in the early 1970s, but it was only with the rise of 
globalization theory that it gained salience in sociology. We have moved a long way in clarifying what we 
mean by, and what is wrong with, methodological nationalism and this paper argues that in International 
Relations the discussion of the so-called ‘domestic analogy’ is closely connected to the sociological debate on 
methodological nationalism. I shall argue that both problems point to a similar substantive direction; namely, 
whether the nation-state is the fundamental building block of modern society. In terms of structure, the first 
section of this article revisits what I consider to be the three waves of the debate on methodological 
nationalism in sociology. The second part connects this discussion with the debate in IR on the domestic 
analogy. The last section brings the two discussions together by arguing that social theory’s claim to 
universalism is a fundamental resource to theorise current global processes beyond both methodological 
nationalism and the domestic analogy. But for us to unpack fully this claim to universalism, we still have to 
come to terms with social theory’s ambivalent relationship with the tradition of natural law. 
 
 
Introduction: The twin critique in sociology and IR 
 
This paper seeks to open up a conversation between two disciplinary traditions, sociology and International 
Relations (IR), regarding the common problems they share when trying to understand the modern nation-
state vis-à-vis international or world society. Although the debate on methodological nationalism has been 
more salient in sociology, it is arguably the case that its implications and consequences are, at least, equally 
relevant for IR.  
 
I shall address this relationship between the two disciplines as follows. The article first revisits the debate on 
methodological nationalism in sociology and highlights the key aspects of each of the three waves of the 
discussion – in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a critique of Parsonian sociology, at the end of the last 
century as the rise of globalisation theory, and more recently as a reassessment of the national and global 
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aspects of sociology. The second section surveys IR’s debate over the domestic analogy. As sociology’s 
coming to terms with its own methodological nationalism has revitalised the discipline’s theoretical self-
reflection, a similar gain may be available for IR with regard to the domestic analogy. More specifically, I shall 
argue that attention is paid not only to the difficulties arising out of its ‘domestic’ side but also to those 
coming out of its ‘analogical’ aspect. The article’s third and last part offers some resources for the 
simultaneous critique of methodological nationalism and the domestic analogy. Surely, contemporary 
solutions to the problems faced by sociology and IR require novel, original and more flexible ways of studying 
the nation-state’s unprecedented current transformations but they equally need to reengage with their own 
past and philosophical foundations. I should like to emphasise that current attempts at understanding the 
current condition of modernity, and the position of the nation-state within it, may better off by 
acknowledging classical social theory’s claim to universalism – the truly worldwide vocation of modernity – and 
its natural law layout – the presupposition of the fundamental unity of the human species and ultimate equality 
of all individual human beings. For us to do so, however, we may still have to come to terms with these 
disciplines’ debt to the tradition of natural law. 
 
The critique of methodological nationalism in sociology: A debate in three waves 
 
The first explicit wave of critiques of methodological nationalism became salient in the 1970s and its history is 
closer to the discipline of sociology than to any other social science – and there seem to be good reasons for 
that to be the case. A first underlying theme running through it was the highly popular demolition exercise of 
the still predominant Parsonian mainstream in sociology back then and it is difficult to overlook the rather ad-
hominem way in which the first wave of the argument took shape. The debate could effortlessly but in 
retrospect also rather artificially cohere because, underneath an apparent disparity of concerns over the 
problems being experienced when conceptualising nations and nation-states, the common enemy was the 
alleged as well as real shortcomings of Parsons’ systemic model. Indeed, as it happened with the 
misconceptions and miscarriages of the broader debate on Parsons’ sociology (Alexander 1987, Gerhardt 
2002), a number of prejudices and even opposite charges were already and simultaneously being pressed 
against him. Thus, when in an excellent essay on the question of time in sociological theory Herminio Martins 
(1974: 247) actually coined the notion ‘methodological nationalism’, he began the article by arguing that ‘the 
demolition of functionalism is almost an initiation rite of passage into sociological adulthood or at least 
adolescence. If functionalism did not exist – or had not existed – it would have had to be invented’.1 Martins 
                                                 
1 The exact quotation in which Martins (1974: 276) came up with the term ‘methodological nationalism’ also 
bears the mark of a critique of Parsons: ‘In the last three decades or so the principle of immanent change has 
largely coincided with a general presumption – supported by a great variety of scholars in the entire spectrum 
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was in fact referring to the way in which a number of sociologists had launched ferocious attacks on 
Parsonianism – and even on Parsons’ himself – on all sorts of grounds: Ralf Dahrendof’s (1958) critique of 
the alleged conservative utopianism of the Parsonian view of the social system; David Lockwood’s (1992 
[1963]) attempt to give functionalism a critical edge on the basis of his distinction between social and systemic 
integration, Gianfranco Poggi’s (1965) critique of Parsons’ inability to study interstate relations, Anthony 
Giddens’ (1977) later attack on functionalism’s logical and epistemological difficulties – to name only those 
whose charges can be directly related to the deficiencies of methodological nationalism.2  
 
If we were now to formalise the main aspects under discussion during this first wave, we would see that the 
critique of methodological nationalism meant three highly related yet different charges against the social 
sciences’ understanding of the nation-state. They were guilty of: (1) regarding the nation-state as the necessary 
container of modern social relations (Martins 1974); (2) conceiving of it as a natural representation of modern 
‘society’ (Giddens 1985) and; (3) reifying the nation and thus neglecting the active role of nationalism as a 
modern political ideology (Smith 1983). A key feature of this early debate was that the historical record 
seemed to buttress a view of the modern world as increasingly organised around nation-states. In the 
aftermath of the decolonisation process of the 1960s, none of these writers was prepared to doubt that the 
nation-state was actually becoming a major determining factor in the modern word. Rather, they were 
concerned with the ways in which the nation-state was being conceptualised at the time; their problem was 
with the tendency to theorise the nation-state as though a monad which evolved and behaved autonomously 
and, because of that, to regard the international system of nation-states as a mere reflection of the behaviour 
of its individual members. In fact, a central point of these early critiques of methodological nationalism was 
the dissatisfaction with a certain internalist emphasis in the explanation of those social forces which 
contributed to the creation of individual nation-states (state bureaucratisation, national class structure), and 
not with the historical salience of the nation-state per se. The definition of methodological nationalism I prefer 
arises from these insights: the equation between the idea of society and the historical formation of the nation-
state in modernity. And the critique of methodological nationalism comes about when the nation-state stops 
being the necessary representation of modern society on both historical and conceptual grounds.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
of sociological opinion – that the “total” or “inclusive society”, in effect the nation-state, be deemed to be the 
standard, optimal or even maximal “isolate” for sociological analysis (…) a kind of methodological nationalism (...) 
imposes itself in practice with national community as the terminal unit and boundary condition for the 
demarcation of problems and phenomena for social science’ (my italics). 
2 These criticisms fall, in my view, short of an adequate understanding of Parsonian sociology. And more 
importantly when it comes to the question of understanding the nation-state, they seem to have prevented the 
use of Parsons’ own contributions to the very issues that got the debate on the critique of methodological 
nationalism going (Chernilo 2007a: 77-93). 
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A second wave of scholarly critiques of methodological nationalism started at the turn of the new century. 
The criticisms of the previous generation on some of the conceptual shortcomings of mainstream sociology 
seemed to find further support via the ‘empirical’ assessment on the decline of the nation-state. Indeed, the 
re-emergence of the debate on and critiques of methodological nationalism is inextricably associated with 
understanding globalisation. And this is also a reason why the central tenets of this new wave are possibly 
more familiar as they draw heavily on the popular writings of sociology’s most recent ‘globalisation 
orthodoxy’ (Albrow 1996, Bauman 1998, Beck 2000, Castells 1996, Urry 2000). All their differences 
notwithstanding, in relation to the critique of methodological nationalism the arguments of this group seem 
to cohere on the historical thesis that the nation-state was no longer the necessary representation of society in 
modernity. As soon as globalisation, however defined, came to announce the advent of a new epoch in or 
even beyond modernity, the nation-state became the first victim of this epochal change. The nation-state was 
the most relevant actor of previous historical constellations but its time is now definitively over.3 There is in 
fact a mixture of historical arguments – the rise of globalisation and fall of the nation-state – and theoretical 
arguments – the exhaustion of modernity and the inapplicability of universalistic concepts such as society – 
which ends up configuring the new scenario in which the traditional ways that sociology used to comprehend 
the world were quickly becoming obsolete.  
 
Despite all their exaggerations, there are two arguments to be made in favour of this more recent body of 
literature. Firstly, globalisation theorists made apparent the difficulties of the unreflective use of notions such 
as nationhood and society and, in so doing, have draw our attention to the salience of methodological 
nationalism in both theory and practice (Calhoun 1999, Smelser 1997). Secondly, they have encouraged, even 
if unwittingly, a more detailed scrutiny into whether past images of sociology effectively fall under the spell of 
methodological nationalism. It is then fair to say that we have moved a long way from the early days when the 
critique of methodological nationalism was yet another way of getting rid off Parsons. But as these writers’ 
hypostatised the nation-state’s most recent crisis for the thesis of its definitive decline, the consequence has 
been that the charge of methodological nationalism became, in practice, coeval with any purported study of 
the nation-state in its own terms. In other words, they left us with little option but claiming that the very 
attempt at studying the nation-state with conventional social scientific means became coeval with its effective 
reification and naturalisation.  
                                                 
3 In Beck’s formulation (2002: 51-2), the ‘national organization as a structuring principle of societal and 
political action can no longer serve as a premise for the social science observer perspective. In this sense, 
social science can only react to the challenge of globalization adequately if it manages to overcome 
methodological nationalism, and if it manages to raise empirically and theoretically fundamental questions 
within specialized fields of research and thus elaborate the foundations of a cosmopolitan social and political 
science’. See Chernilo (2006) on the shortcomings of Beck’s critique of methodological nationalism. 
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The new millennium has however witnessed the rise of a third wave of discussion on methodological 
nationalism. I should like to follow Luke Martell’s (2007) insight and argue that, as the rise of a third wave in 
globalisation studies is turning some of the previous shortcomings and exaggerations into more sober 
accounts of it, we witness a similar move in relation to the critiques of methodological nationalism. There are 
now an increasing number of writers who question the accuracy of methodological nationalism’s 
representation of the past of sociology and in so doing they offer a new image of both sociology and the 
nation-state (Fine 2003, 2007, Inglis and Robertson 2008, Outhwaite 2006, Turner 1990, 2006, Chernilo 
2007a). Surely, the leitmotif of this third wave is also that methodological nationalism must be rejected and 
transcended. Against wave one, we no longer regard the nation-state as the natural and necessary 
representation of society in modernity – and we also realise that there is no in-built internalist bias in 
sociological conceptions of development. In contradistinction to wave two, for its part, the claim on the 
definitive decline of the nation-state is obviously as one-sided as the one that spoke of its historical necessity, 
and the charge that methodological nationalism is the defining feature of the history of the sociology has been 
refuted. Actually, at least part of what is at stake refers to whether the accusation of social theory’s immanent 
methodological nationalism says more about the deficiencies of those who make the claim than it tells us 
about the history of social theory itself. It is maintained, moreover, that the use of concepts with a 
universalistic intent such as ‘society’, has to be revisited and refined but by no means given up. It shall be my 
contention in the final section of this piece that the key resource we have for the task of deepening our 
understanding of the current situation of the nation-state in the current conjuncture lies precisely in 
recovering and bringing up to date the original universalistic vocation and orientation of the history of social 
theory. Current world society is no doubt unlike that of the early expansion of capitalism in the eighteenth 
centuries. But for us to reconsider continuities as much as discontinuities a soberer account of the tradition of 
social theory, and of the key philosophical underpinnings of its key concepts, remains a necessary step. Yet 
before we can take up this step let me turn to how a similar debate has unfolded in IR. 
 
Methodological nationalism in IR? Querying the ‘domestic analogy’ 
 
The connection between both debates in the two disciplines is not difficult to establish. Indeed, Martin Shaw 
(2000: 68) has drawn attention to the links between methodological nationalism and its IR counterpart – 
namely, the domestic analogy:  
 
Much social science sorted social relations (…) simply assuming the coincidence of social boundaries 
with state boundaries and that social action occurred primarily within, and secondarily across, these 
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divisions (…) The core disciplines of the social sciences, whose intellectual traditions are reference 
points for each other and for other fields, were therefore domesticated – in the sense of being 
preoccupied not with Western and world civilizations as wholes but with the “domestic” forms of 
particular national societies (…this is called…) “methodological nationalism” and “territorialism”. 
What it involved, above all, was a slippage from the general to the particular without bringing into the 
open the problematic abstraction involved in isolating the national case 
 
Not too dissimilar a case, on this particular theme at least, is put forward by Justin Rosenberg (2006: 312) 
when he argues that IR’s inability to think about ‘the international’ has to do with a domestic bias: 
  
in the classical sociological tradition we find dynamic theorizations of internal change over historical time 
(the sequence of ancient, medieval and modern forms of society); and we find comparative theorizations 
of external difference across cultural space (contrasting European social structures with the Ottoman, 
Indian and Chinese among others). What we do not find, however, is a drawing together of these 
dynamic and comparative moments of analysis in order to theorize a specifically inter-societal 
dimension of social change (…) while Classical Social Theory provides enormous resources for 
enriching international theory, and for throwing any number of illuminating sidelights onto its central 
concerns, nowhere do we find it taking intellectual possession of those concerns themselves. Quite 
simply, there is no classical sociological theory of “the international”  
 
Both authors point in the direction I am looking form as they establish the mirroring or even self-reinforcing 
effects of methodological nationalism and the domestic analogy. More precisely, if methodological 
nationalism was regarded as mainstream sociology’s most important impediment to theorising global social 
processes, so the argument goes, the same holds true for IR’s particular version of it – the domestic analogy. 
Interestingly, although Shaw and Rosenberg differ in a number of other important respects, the way in which 
they set-up this particular relationship still works within the defining terms of the second wave of the critique 
of methodological nationalism.4 Their arguments are built upon a premise that is now being fundamentally 
                                                 
4 It is curious to note, for instance, how Rosenberg (2005) echoes almost by the word the kind of criticisms to 
classical sociology put forward by the same globalisation theorists he has so duly, and vehemently, criticised. 
The problem lies, in my view, in the methodological way in which he finds the whole canon of social theory 
at fault – ‘Montesquieu, Rousseau, Smith, Condorcet, Malthus, Saint-Simon, Comte, Tocqueville, Marx, Mill, 
Spencer, Tönnies, Weber, Durkheim, Pareto and Simmel’ – only to give later all the credit to a single towering 
figure (in his case, Leon Trotsky, Rosenberg 2006: 336-7). There is something troublingly fascinating indeed 
in this obsession to criticise classical social theory for having had no theory of the national (Smith 1983), the 
nation-state (Wimmer and Schiller 2002), the international (Rosenberg 2006), the global (Shaw 2000, Scholte 
2000) or the cosmopolitan (Beck 2006). 
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questioned in the most recent wave of critiques of methodological nationalism; namely, the extent to which 
its prevalence has in fact been such a defining feature of classical and twentieth-century sociology. I find it 
reasonable that, if a renovated interest in past sociology has produced unexpected results in relation to the 
nation-state, equally remarkable outcomes may arise when revisiting IR’s explicit discussions on the domestic 
analogy.  
 
In Hedley Bull’s (1977: 46) classical formulation, the domestic analogy is ‘the argument from the experience 
of individual men in domestic society to the experience of states, according to which states, like individuals, 
are capable of orderly social life only if, in Hobbes’ phrase, they stand in awe of a common power’. A 
domestic analogy refers, then, to whether an ‘international society’ can be founded, and establish the sources 
of its own legitimacy, by analogically inferring what its central features are from those of the ‘internal’ 
organisation of ‘national societies’. Although without explicitly speaking of it, Bull (1977: 140) himself seems 
aware of how methodological nationalism and the domestic analogy support one another:  
 
The first function of international law has been to identify, as the supreme normative principle of the 
political organisation of mankind, the idea of a society of sovereign states (…) Order in the great 
society of mankind has been attained, during the present phase of the modern states system, through 
general acceptance of the principle that men and territory are divided into states, each with its own 
proper sphere of authority, but linked together by a common set of rules. International law, by stating 
and elaborating this principle and by excluding alternative principles (…) establishes this particular 
realm of ideas as the determining one for human thought and action in the present  
 
It is indeed worthy of mention that Bull’s interest in the domestic analogy takes place roughly at the same 
time as when the critique of methodological nationalism arose in sociology – since the late 1960s. But the 
relevance of this temporal coincidence lies at a more substantive plane. Both debates took shape in direct yet 
implicit relation to already popular assessments of methodological individualism’s flaws in their explications 
of social phenomena (Lukes 1973, Macpherson 1962). Surely, the original meaning of the notion 
methodological nationalism mirrored that of methodological individualism as the same problems of upward 
conflation that were derived from the latter (its bottom-up conceptualisation of social relations) were now 
found in the former: a sociological conceptualisation of modernity has always been more than the sum of 
whatever number of national trajectories (Chernilo forthcoming). It thence follows that international relations 
could not be appropriately studied if conceived of exclusively as the result of interactions among individual 
nation-states. Needless to say, this is precisely the focus of Bull’s critique of the domestic analogy and the 
basis of his notions of the international system and society. Neither in the 1970s nor in more recent 
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discussions, however, has this connection between both kinds of methodological reductionisms been 
attempted (a path, I cannot, unfortunately, pursue here).  
 
If we now turn our attention to Bull’s crucial proposition that the ‘international system’ is best described as an 
‘anarchical society’, it is apparent that he sought to grasp the rather paradoxical nature of the phenomenon of 
states’ ordered relations in the absence of a single and central authority that would be willing and capable of 
enforcing such an order. The domestic analogy fails thus to account for the peculiar nature of ‘the 
international’ from both ends: from the anarchical side, because the lack of an international Leviathan simply 
cannot be described as a state of nature; and from the society side because the kind of order that is actually 
present in international relations expresses a communality of purpose, interests or even values among states 
that has normative components that go well beyond fear to an all-powerful world-state. In other words, Bull’s 
critique of the domestic analogy depends upon a more fundamental critique of methodological nationalism 
because, in his view, IR’s conceptual core can only be secured if the international is defined as an autonomous 
realm of social relations whose existence and autonomy can be credited regardless of the presence of a state. 
States are of course present and have a role in Bull’s ‘international society’, but when it comes to his critique 
of the domestic analogy the key point is, in my view, that of the logical as well as ontological independence 
between state and society. 
 
In his attempt at theorising the different sources of order that make up the notion of the international society, 
Bull follows Martin Wight’s distinction of three traditions. In between the two extreme positions of Hobbesian 
realism – based on the fear to war – and Kantian universalism, based on a ‘potential community of mankind’, Bull 
(1977: 24) opts for what he terms as Grotian internationalism:  
 
The Grotian prescription for an international conduct is that all states, in dealings with one another, 
are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form. As against the view of the 
Hobbesians, states in the Grotian view are bound not only by rules of prudence or expediency but 
also by imperatives of morality and law. But as against the view of the universalists, what these 
imperatives enjoin is not the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a universal 
community of mankind, but rather acceptance of the requirements of coexistence and co-operation in 
a society of states (Bull: 1977: 27)5 
 
                                                 
5 I believe Bull misrepresents Kant’s position as if best represented in the notion of a political community of 
all human beings. Even when Bull (1977: 244, 322) acknowledges that Kant’s cosmopolitanism explicitly 
advocates for a ‘league of “republican states’, he wrongly treats that league as a ‘substitute goal’ (Bottici 2003, 
Habermas 2001, Huntley 1996, Fine 2007). More on this below. 
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The fact that Bull construed his positive argument on international society around the critique of the 
domestic analogy means that, as a way of thinking, its existence and relevance for the field as a whole was 
beyond question. Bull’s theoretical framework fully rejected the domestic analogy but, equally importantly, it 
had to be able to establish the discipline on strong enough grounds as to avoid its eventual reintroduction – 
implicitly or otherwise – thence the strategic importance he attributed to conceptualising the ‘international 
society’ as an autonomous field of social relations. It is interesting to ask how, and with independence of 
Bull’s own intentions, this form theoretical reasoning has been later assessed as an attempt at transcending the 
domestic analogy.  
 
Barry Buzan (2004: 26) has concentrated on exactly this difficult problem in his recent reassessment of the 
English school. On the one side, he recognises that this school’s key notion of international society ‘is not 
based on the crude idea of a “domestic analogy” (…) which simply scales the society within states up to the 
global level’ (my italics). Yet on the other side, he makes the point that the case is less clear-cut than it first 
appears because ‘[t]he basic idea of international society is quite simple: just as human beings as individuals 
live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by, so also states live in an international society which 
they shape and are shaped by’ (Buzan 2004: 8). In his account, therefore, the three traditions we have seen 
Wight and Bull identify as the intellectual sources of international relations are all equally able to buttress the 
domestic analogy: individuals as well as nation-states may enter into ordered or even legal relations among 
themselves out of fear (the Hobbesian version of the analogy), shared interests (the Grotian version) or moral 
duty (the Kantian version). The point then is whether or not some kind of domestic analogy is in actual 
operation despite any particular author’s explicit intentions. And in fact a major argument in Buzan’s own 
reassessment of the English school is that the very notion that looks best equipped to conceptualise current 
global transformations and challenges, that of the ‘world society’, is little else than a ‘residual category’ or an 
‘analytical dustbin’ (Buzan 2004: 28, 44). It is in the absence of a consistent notion of world society that the 
backdoor stays open for the reintroduction of the domestic analogy; namely ‘the creation of the global 
equivalent of domestic politics’ (Buzan 2004: 35).  
 
I have two preliminary comments to make on these reflections for what I shall be arguing in the final section 
of this article. Firstly, it is true that no concept of world society is available in Bull’s work. Yet Bull speaks 
consistently of those deeper normative commitments that underpin not only any possible conception of 
world society but also his actual notions of international system and international society. A ‘cosmopolitan or 
world justice’ is not readily noticeable as a social phenomenon but can nonetheless be identified as ‘the 
common ends or values of the universal society of all mankind, whose constituent members are individual 
human beings’ (Bull 1977: 84). Buzan (2004: 36) is right in pointing out that the idea of world society we 
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require cannot simply be based upon the ontological and normative primacy of the individual.6 And below I 
will be taking up Bull’s insight on the presence of certain underlying universalistic commitments very 
seriously; namely, social theory’s natural law layout. In fact, similar to what happens with the notion of 
international society, again in the case of world society the question is whether the concept refers to a 
particular realm whose autonomous existence can be unequivocally established. Secondly, Buzan’s (2004: 39) 
own framing of the question of the recurrence of natural law is revealing of the difficulties we face: ‘[o]ne of 
the curiosities here is that both the moral primacy of individuals and the assumption of universalism come 
out of the natural law tradition that Bull rejected, yet remained strong in his conception of international and 
world society’. As I suggested it in the previous section, the tradition of social theory is a rich intellectual 
source from which to reconstruct and then unpack the claim to universalism that is necessary for any 
contemporary notion of world society. But for us to do so, I shall be drawing the admittedly troubling 
consequence that natural law keeps coming back to haunt social theory. More positively, it is my contention 
that we still need to address the question of social theory’s natural law heritage and we must pursue such an 
endeavour without presupposing that modern social theory has already succeeded in leaving natural law definitively behind. 
 
To date, the most systematic survey available on the domestic analogy in IR seems to uphold the view that 
understanding its role and prevalence escapes simple definitions. Hidemi Suganami’s definition of the analogy 
is not only different from Bull’s; it also helps display some of the real difficulties it poses: ‘[t]he “domestic 
analogy” is presumptive reasoning which holds that there are certain similarities between domestic and 
international phenomena; that, in particular, the conditions of order within states are similar to those of order 
between them; and that therefore those institutions which sustain order domestically should be reproduced at 
the international level’ (Suganami 1989: 1). In fact, part of his argument is that no real debate on the origins, 
role and prevalence of the domestic analogy in IR had yet taken place. Rather the opposite, ‘apart from 
exceptional instances where a debate appears actually to have taken place (…) the idea of a “debate” is 
metaphorical. What can in fact be said to have existed are contending intellectual dispositions in the long line 
of speculations about the system of states’ (Suganami 1989: 22-3). But similar to what happens in the debate 
on methodological nationalism that is increasingly no longer the case. The question of IR’s reliance on the 
domestic analogy has remained at the centre of the complaints within the discipline on the chronic 
weaknesses of its own theoretical foundations (Bottici 2003, Buzan 2004, Rosenberg 2006, Shaw 2000, Walzer 
1977). Suganami’s own position goes however in a different direction from that of the reining consensus in 
IR: ‘[a]gainst the apparent intellectual legi,timacy of the belief in the defectiveness of the domestic analogy, 
                                                 
6 In sociology, such possibility is readily available in Niklas Luhmann’s notion of a world society (Luhmann 
1977, Stichweh 2000). Luhmann’s work has been introduced into IR by Mathias Albert and his colleagues at 
Bielefeld University. See, for example, Albert and Hilkermeier eds. (2004). 
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particularly among the contemporary academic specialists of IR, there lingers the notion that perhaps some 
form of domestic analogy is acceptable after all (…) some degree of concession to the analogy is beneficial’ (Suganami 1989: 10 
& 1). If this sociologist understands the situation correctly, the challenge is that IR legitimately aspires to 
establish firmly the autonomy of ‘the international’ as a specific realm of the social, so it is bound to explicitly 
reject the use of the domestic analogy in whatever shape or form. The question remains, however, why has IR 
been unable to expunge the device entirely and keeps not only reintroducing it but also, as Suganami points 
out, giving ‘some degree of concession’ to it. 
 
Although he does not really develop it, Suganami himself hints towards a different angle for the assessment of 
the domestic analogy. He suggests that contemporary scholars may be misreading the extent to which the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers who had allegedly launched the use of the domestic analogy in IR 
‘considered their legal reasoning as being specifically analogical when they asserted that certain principles 
governed the relations of sovereigns. These principles, in their view, were axiomatic and governed human conduct 
universally. It was because of this axiomatic universal validity that, in their view, natural law governed 
international relations’ (Suganami 1989: 19, my italics). Suganami’s critical insight is that the debate on the 
domestic analogy cannot centre only on the accuracy of its domestic dimension but that its analogical element 
must also be questioned. A point Chiara Bottici (2003: 402) has forcefully made in her reading of Kant’s 
cosmopolitan outlook as a critique of the domestic analogy: 
 
Kant could never have moved from the domestic experience for saying that, since this has been 
successful, states should follow it and also enter a lawful condition – as Bull in his interpretation 
suggests. On the contrary, Kant moves from an a priori postulate of reason and then applies it to all 
possible cases: individual within a nation, states in their relationship with one another, and finally, 
individual and states as far as human beings are regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind  
 
Without entering here into a discussion on the problems of a priori reasoning, it is sufficient for my argument 
to note that, because an analogy is a form of thinking that uses empirical evidence that is held valid within a 
particular realm and extrapolates it onto a different one, no domestic analogy is found in Kant. Rather the 
opposite, Kant’s preferred form of conceptualization is based on the systematic application of fundamental 
principles that hold valid to all realms of human life. In relation to IR’s difficulty with the domestic analogy, 
the question of the ontological autonomy of the international vis-à-vis the national and the global remains of 
course a critical issue, but one which is now suspended until we answer the prior question of whether the 
similarities and differences between these realms can be thought of analogically. What at first seemed to 
appear as an analogy has in fact demonstrated otherwise; there is a deeper layer of philosophical foundations 
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that points towards an understanding of the social as such. It is only within a general theory of social that it 
makes sense to distinguish among different and autonomous realms – the national, the international, the 
regional and the global (but also some others). The domestic analogy creates so many complications for IR 
not because of the substantive differences between the domestic and the international (as they actually exist) 
but because, methodologically speaking, no analogy can really be deployed when looking at what takes place 
at the domestic level with a view to understanding the international. What we really need to do is to grasp the 
deep-seated philosophical presuppositions that underpin our social scientific conceptualisations of what 
constitutes modern social life in general; it is only, and insofar as, we are able to say something meaningful 
about what is it that constitutes social relations that the differentiation between the local, national, 
international and global levels begins to make sense. IR’s apparent vicious circle of explicit rejection and 
implicit reintroduction of the domestic analogy will only be broken when the domestic analogy is pulled apart 
simultaneously from both ends – the domestic and the analogical. For the broader aim of this article, the argument 
I am putting forward is that a claim to universalism, both analytic and normative, is intrinsic to the very project 
of trying to conceptualise modern social life in all its scales. 
 
Let me bring this section to a close by recalling that the domestic analogy seems to be the particular name that 
the broader debate on methodological nationalism in social theory has adopted in IR. As a substantive field of 
enquiry, both refer to understanding the main features of the nation-state vis-à-vis the global constitution of 
modernity. The reductionist understanding of both sociology and IR on the basis of their respective, indeed 
mutually reinforcing, dependence on iternalist assumptions and biases can and must be refuted; neither 
methodological nationalism nor the domestic analogy lie at the centre of these disciplines. Their critique 
requires thus not only that they are explicitly rejected but to avoid that they are implicitly reintroduced. We 
need to grasp those universalistically oriented conceptions of the social that at all different scales underpin 
modern social theory so that its original claim to universalism can be recovered and then renovated. For us to 
do so, however, the idea of social theory’s natural law layout will have to be reckoned with.  
 
A claim to universalism: Social theory’s natural law layout 
 
The study of the connections between natural law and the rise of social theory is far from original (Fine 2002, 
Habermas 1971, Koselleck 1988, Löwith 1964, Strauss 1974, Toulmin 1990, Troeltsch 1925, Voegelin 2000). 
It is nonetheless fair to argue that this theme does not figure prominently in sociological accounts on the rise 
of social theory. Natural law has been conspicuously absent from most of the best-known accounts of the rise 
of sociology during the twentieth century (Aron 1965, Giddens 1971, Hawthorn 1987, Seidman 1983). And as 
our brief recount in the previous section makes apparent, IR theorists do not seem to find it fashionable to 
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refer to natural law nowadays. But to the extent that early modern natural law theorists such as Suárez, 
Grotius and Puffendorf were explicitly concerned with the foundation and functioning of the international 
system (García y García 1997, Haakonssen 1996, Hochstrasser 2000, Tuck 1981), IR may not be particularly 
unsuited to raise this connection. To put it as clearly as possible, my argument to link universalism and natural 
law refers to the following four planes: (1) its interest in the possibility of supra-historical normative 
standards; (2) its egalitarianism (the view that all individual human beings belong to the same species); (3) its 
critical role in setting rational standards against which actually existing social arrangements can be assessed, 
and; (4) its notion of a stratified ontology so that the (social) world is understood as composed of different 
and autonomous realms. 7 
 
I am aware of the fact that to argue for the salience of natural law presuppositions for the current functioning 
of social theory is far from unproblematic. I should therefore like to make explicit that it is not my intention 
to revive natural law for its own sake or indeed to hold that in natural law we are going to find the master key 
with which to solve all of social theory’s present problems. But contemporary calls for reinventing the wheel 
have proved damaging for social theory’s historical, conceptual and normative reflection. The reassessment of 
its debt to natural law may serve, at the very least, the noble purpose of making apparent social theory’s deep-
seated philosophical structure. But more consequential for my argument here, it will help us move beyond 
both methodological nationalism and the domestic analogy. 
 
Interestingly, and in order to make my argument more plausible in terms of IR, we can again resort to Hedley 
Bull for what I consider to be a sensible attitude to addressing the role of natural law in social theory without 
wanting to pursue a natural-law agenda for its own sake:  
 
I don’t wish to embrace the position of exponents of the doctrine of natural law that (...) primary or 
universal goals of social life are mandatory for all men, or that the binding force of rules of conduct 
upholding them is self-evident to all men. It is true that the position I have adopted here can be said 
                                                 
7 The natural law tradition is of course highly heterogeneous and any attempt to produce a general definition 
of it is likely to cause controversy. Apart from its standard connections with Stoicism and Roman Law 
(d’Entrèves 1970), natural law has been demonstrated compatible with several ancient religious cosmologies 
(Voegelin 1962), Catholic conservatism (Rommen 1998, Gierke 1927), liberalism (Schneewind 1998), different 
kinds of republicanism (Arendt 1958, Benhabib 2004, Bohman 2004, Skinner 1998), postmodern legal studies 
(Douzinas 2000) and even Marxism (Bloch 1996). My thesis that a claim to universalism serves to characterise 
it as a whole may seem to leave out early modern natural-law writers that were of critical importance for the 
establishment of modern conceptions of state sovereignty (i.e. Hobbes and Locke). Against this possible 
objection, I believe that insofar as they were concerned with setting up first principles that would serve to 
establish any form of modern social order, a claim to universalism does remain in place – although admittedly 
its universalistic threshold has been lowered down. 
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to have been part of the “empirical equivalent” of the natural-law theory, which sought to deal with 
elementary or primary conditions of social existence in the idiom of a different era. Indeed, the natural 
law tradition remains one of the richest sources of theoretical insight into the matters dealt with in the 
present study.  But it is not part of my intention to revive the central tenets of natural-law thinking 
itself (Bull: 1977: 6-7) 
 
Bull seeks neither to endorse nor to reinforce natural law yet he finds important to realise that we cannot 
simply ignore it. I would like to take up his insight that there is an intellectual obligation in recognising that 
natural law plays a much bigger role than usually acknowledged, and we may want it to play, within the 
intellectual tradition of the social sciences. My difference with Bull lies in that rather than describing my 
position as an ‘empirical equivalent’ of natural law, I am interested in understanding its role as a template or 
actually a layout without which social scientific concepts and methods can hardly operate. In fact, in a 
paragraph that R. J. Vincent (1988: 198) has described as ‘tantalising’ in the context of Bull’s oeuvre, we read: 
‘it has been maintained that world order, or order within the great society of all mankind, is not only wider than 
international order or order among states, but also more fundamental and primordial than it, and morally prior to it’ 
(Bull 1977: 319, my italics). That a statement such as this one comes at the very end of The Anarchical Society 
shows that Bull seems to have stumbled upon a result that goes beyond his own preferred structural 
diagnostic of the international system as much as beyond the normative consequences that are immediately 
apparent from it. Bull becomes a cosmopolitan in spite of himself, as it were, because he realises the extent to 
which international relations cannot be thought of without universalistic presuppositions that belong to the 
tradition of natural law.8 
 
Social theory’s long-term research agenda – the empirical account of the rise and main features of modern 
social life – depends upon a claim to universalism whose contentious origins lie in the tradition of natural law 
(Chernilo 2007a). Yet the same critical trends that may be seen as challenging natural law’s belief in the unity 
of the human species – historical change, socio-cultural variation and normative disagreement – have 
themselves been referred to as the fundamental experiences that gave rise to natural law. Indeed, it is this 
relationship between unity and diversity, universality and particularity in the origins of the natural law 
tradition that I would like to unfold briefly here. Writing in the 1930s, this is how Catholic lawyer Heinrich 
Rommen (1998: 4) traces the emergence of natural law in separation from divine law: 
 
                                                 
8 In fact, in his later work Bull (1984) increasingly moved towards the more normative wing of the English 
School. Thanks to George Lawson for having raised this point to my attention. 
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The idea of a natural law can emerge only when men come to perceive that not all law is unalterable 
and unchanging divine law. It can emerge only when critical reason, looking back over history, notes 
the profound changes that have occurred in the realm of law and mores and becomes aware of the 
diversity of the legal and moral institutions of its own people in the course of its history; and when, 
furthermore, gazing beyond the confines of its own city-state or tribe, it notices the dissimilarity of the 
institutions of neighboring peoples. When, therefore, human reason wonderingly verifies this 
diversity, it first arrives at the distinction between divine and human law  
 
From this fundamentally religious formulation, we can see that traditional natural law entered modernity – 
and thus social theory – via the secularisation of some of its presuppositions. The thesis of the rise of 
modernity as a process of secularisation, the way in which transcendental references to a divinely organised 
cosmos are transformed into an immanent conception of history understood exclusively in terms of human 
progress, was masterfully taken up by Karl Löwith in the late 1940s: 
 
A universal history directed toward one single end and unifying, at least potentially, the whole course 
of events was not created by Voltaire but by Jewish messianism and Christian eschatology, on the 
basis of an exclusive monotheism. Once this belief had been adopted generally and had prevailed for 
centuries, man could discard the doctrine of providence, along with that of creation, judgement, and 
salvation, but he would not return to such views as had satisfied the ancients. Man will seek to replace 
providence, but within the established horizon, by secularizing the Christian hope of salvation into an 
indefinite hope of improvement and faith in God’s providence into the belief in man’s capacity to 
provide for his own earthly happiness (Löwith: 1964: 111) 
 
Following Löwith, part of my argument here is that classical social theory took up a challenge that is similar to 
the one which is described as central to natural law. With modernity, the idea of humanity can only be 
meaningfully comprehended if treated as a single subject and this is a presupposition shared by modern social 
theory and the natural law tradition alike. Yet I should not wish to endorse another aspect of Löwith’s thesis; 
namely, that social theory has no cognitive autonomy whatsoever and to that extent it effectively dissolves 
into yet another form of natural law.9 Writing in the early 1950s and a friend of Löwith’s, Leo Strauss was 
precisely of the idea that natural law had to be approached with full independence of religion. Indeed, that is 
precisely the reason why he prefers the notion of natural right rather than natural law to frame his intellectual 
                                                 
9 The so-called secularisation debate was initiated by Hans Blumenberg’s (1983) response to Löwith, which 
centred on the question of the legitimacy of modernity’s claim to fully secular self-assertion. See Barash 
(1998) and Wallace (1981) for further discussion. 
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enquiry there: ‘knowledge of the indefinitely large variety of notions of right and wrong is so far from being 
incompatible with the idea of natural right that it is the essential condition of the emergence of the idea: 
realization of the variety of notions of right is the incentive for the quest of natural right’ (Strauss 1974: 10). 
He goes further back than to Christianity and seeks the origins of the natural right tradition in Socrates and 
Plato. It is there, argues Strauss (1974: 89), that ‘the discovery of nature is identical with the actualization of a 
human possibility which, at least according to its own interpretation, is trans-historical, trans-social, trans-
moral and trans-religious’.  
 
Strauss is interested in comparing the natural right theories of classical Greece with those that gave rise to 
modern thinking in the works of Machiavelli and Hobbes. The central feature both traditions share is that 
they are similarly based upon anthropological (immanent) rather than religious (transcendent) premises. The 
answer to the questions of what constitutes the humanity of human beings and how to best pursue life in 
common are based upon the thesis that ‘[a]ll natural right doctrines claim that the fundamentals of justice are, 
in principle, accessible to man as man’ (Strauss 1974: 28). But Strauss also highlights the differences between 
Greek and modern natural right doctrines; the most salient among them being that only the moderns have a 
conception of fully ‘egalitarian natural right (…in which…) all men are by nature free and equal. Natural freedom 
and natural equality are inseparable from each other’ (Straus 1974: 118, my italics).10  
 
Social theory has surely sought to overcome all different versions of natural law theory but, in so doing, it 
tends to presuppose and fall back to some form of it. In speaking of modern social theory’s natural law 
layout, therefore, I refer to a deep-seated philosophical commitment that can be found in operation regardless 
of whether it is explicitly recognised or desired. To the extent that its rise coincides with that of modernity’s 
global expansion and impact, social theory has its own a vested interest in grasping what is it that now 
constitutes, to paraphrase Bull’s formulation, our ‘great society of mankind’: what is it that makes modern 
social relations social, why do they keep expanding all across the world, how can such novel forms of social 
relations be studied, are we able to determine unequivocally the best possible way of organising our life in 
common. Even if it would be wholly inappropriate to see sociology or IR as the social scientific incarnation 
of a natural-law doctrine that had developed mostly at a philosophical level, I believe it necessary to spell out 
some of their natural law presuppositions so that we can critically reflect upon them. It is my contention, 
therefore, that modern social theory emerging in the nineteenth century is built upon this kind of natural law 
layout. The social sciences work under the normative and analytical presuppositions of the fundamental unity of the 
                                                 
10 As he arrives at this formulation, Strauss (1974: 181-2) himself makes the point that modern natural right 
thinking is closely associated to liberalism. But it is his own account of natural right’s historical evolution that 
saves Strauss from Robert Nisbet’s (1967) mistake of conflating natural law as such with the modern 
egalitarianism of the Enlightenment. 
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human species and of the equality of all individual human beings. This natural law layout underpins – more often 
implicitly than not – the work of the most salient social theorists not only in their normative standpoints but 
also in their concepts and methods (Chernilo 2009a). It not only runs deeper than methodological nationalism 
and the domestic analogy but can also play an important role in their critique.  
 
Furthermore, this narration I have so sketchily introduced may lend support to the view that modern social 
theory had to construe a subtler and more differentiated conception of universalism in order to explain the 
dramatically enhanced experienced of cultural particularisms and ethical discrepancies in modernity. The very 
idea of the social upon which our disciplines have been historically established presupposes the unity of the 
human species and the equality of individual human beings. All forms of gender, ethnic, cultural, national and 
religious differences are theorised as something internal to the substantive unity of humanity; the very 
existence of such differences is taken as the expression of the ultimate equality of all human beings. 
Everything can be different among human groupings – mores, tastes, norms and values – but the idea that 
something social emerges out of the interaction about human beings ultimately underpins all these 
differences. Social theory explicitly sought to leave natural law behind but, in practice, still requires it because 
its key concepts presuppose an argument about humanity’s ultimate unity. The tradition of social theory 
requires a claim to universalism that operates at three formally independent, yet mutually reinforcing, planes: 
(1) the normative idea of a single modern society that encompasses the whole of globe and all human beings; 
(2) the conceptual definition of what is the social element in modern social relations and; (3) the methodological 
justification of how to generate adequate empirical knowledge (Chernilo 2007b).  
 
As it is obviously impossible even begin to substantiate these propositions in full, let me finalise by abusing of 
Bull’s work to illustrate further my key claims. A crucial element in his reflections on the nature of order in 
the international society is the way in which, ever since its origins within a natural law framework in the 
seventeenth century, international law has tried to establish itself beyond natural law, only for later writers to 
be confronted with it in a renovated fashion. Indeed, the very coinage of the term ‘international law’ was 
expected to express the final decline of natural law and the advent of a true positive science of international 
relations: 
 
In identifying the sources of the rules by which states are bound, theorists of international society in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries turned away from natural law and towards positive 
international law (…) When they came to formulate the rules of coexistence, theorists of this period 
were able to free themselves of the universalist or solidarist assumptions inherited from mediaeval 
times, and to take account of the unique characteristics of the anarchical society. The term “law of 
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nations”, droit des gens, Volkrrecht, not only drove out the term “law of nature”, with which it had 
previously always been coupled; it came quite clearly to mean not law common to all nations, but law 
between nations. The transition was completed when the term “law of nations” itself gave way to 
“international law’, the term coined by Bentham in 1789 in his Introduction to the principles of Morals and 
Legislation (Bull 1977: 35-6) 
 
The plot is fascinating. On one side, Bull acknowledges how short-lived this apparently definitive rejection of 
natural law became – both explicitly and implicitly: ‘[i]t was characteristic of the natural law theorists that they 
in no case wholly liberated themselves from the ambiguities of the Roman term ius gentium, as between its 
modern meaning of “international law” or law between states and nations, and its original meaning of a law 
common to all nations’ (Bull 1977: 30). In other words, the more international law sought to go beyond and 
overcome its natural law origins, the more it was drawn back to it. On the other side, however, ‘[i]deas of 
international society in the twentieth century may be said to be closer to those that were entertained in the 
early centuries of the states system than to those that prevailed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ 
(Bull 1977: 38). Rather than a linear path towards either the fulfilment or the definitive decline of natural law, 
Bull’s own analysis point towards the permanent Aufhebung – the suspension and carrying forward – of natural 
law presuppositions.  
 
Problematic as any attempt at connecting social theory with natural law surely is, it is my contention that we 
can break away from conservative or highly metaphysical versions of natural law only if we are willing to deal 
with them head on. Natural law will not simply vanish into thin air, but its claim to universalism can surely be 
refined, made more reflective and become subject to critical reflection. The more we recognise this natural 
law layout and start making explicit that which until now remained implicit, the more we can refine our 
critiques of both methodological nationalism and the domestic analogy. Precarious and temporary as they will 
surely remain, the solutions we require depend upon subtler references to social theory’s claim to 
universalism. 
 
Conclusions  
 
Methodological nationalism and the domestic analogy are real, but they are neither the most fundamental 
presupposition of their respective disciplines nor the key feature of social theory as an intellectual tradition. If, 
as I am arguing here, social theory’s critical core lies rather in a claim to universalism whose natural law layout 
still needs to be fully understood, what we need to do in order to overcome methodological nationalism and 
the domestic analogy is to uncover what lies underneath them. The kind of critique I am suggesting requires 
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that we are able to see through methodological nationalism and the domestic analogy by reconstructing and 
reassessing the natural law elements that remain within social theory.  
 
The openness to understand what is changing in the current conjuncture requires that we also acknowledge 
what remains. Sociology and IR’s attempts to conceptualise the global vis-à-vis the national and the 
international belong fully in the tradition of classical social theory’s claim to universalism. In contradistinction 
to the case we often get in contemporary writings in either discipline, my argument is that no major 
theoretical overhaul is in sight. The notions of the global, world society or cosmopolitanism we find in 
classical social theory are surely full of difficulties, and corrections are needed to make profitable use of them 
in the present. But the critical point is that, rather than more or less spectacular declarations of obsolescence, 
the resources we need are to be found deeper and within the canon of social theory itself. Deeper, because its 
natural law layout is not immediately apparent and needs to be brought out; within, because it is about 
refining one of social theory’s most enduring feature, its universalistic legacy. I am not arguing here that all we 
need to do to move beyond methodological nationalism is to spend some time reading old books and draw 
on early modern metaphysics. But neither will we move forward by simplifying our historical and 
philosophical understanding of the social sciences’ key concepts. 
 
Sociology and IR have much to learn from one another – not least in relation to how to come to terms with 
their own common history. IR has experienced chronic problems in arriving at a notion of the international 
that cuts ice, its key contribution to researching into the global and cosmopolitan aspects of the world society 
seems to lie, even if in spite of itself, in its slightly clearer awareness of its debt to natural law. This potential 
may begin to be realised, however, if it stops being afraid or ashamed of natural law and starts treating the 
tradition for what it is. Sociology, for its part, must revisit the way in which it narrates its own past as if there 
was no pending debt to natural law. Yet its long-lasting preoccupation with modernity’s universalistic 
vocation, as well as its concern with an ever more abstract definition of the social, remain sociology’s 
irreplaceable contribution to understanding what modern social life is about. The discussions in both 
disciplines show that there is no need to see either intellectual tradition as fully defective. Rather, we may be 
better advised if, in reconstructing them, we let difficulties emerge and tentative solutions unfold. What we 
require is a revision of our understanding of the foundational period of the social sciences so that we stop 
imposing a view of the centrality and necessity of the nation-state that is simply not valid.  
 
17 April 2009. 
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